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Abstract—We address the problem of centralized detection
of a binary event in the presence of falsifiable sensor nodes
(SNs) (i.e., controlled by an attacker) for a bandwidth-constrained
under−attack spatially uncorrelated distributed wireless sensor
network (WSN). The SNs send their quantized test statistics over
orthogonal channels to the fusion center (FC), which linearly
combines them to reach a final decision. First (considering that
the FC and the attacker do not act strategically), we derive (i) the
FC optimal weight combining; (ii) the optimal SN to FC transmit
power, and (iii) the test statistic quantization bits that maximize
the probability of detection (Pd). We also derive an expression
for the attacker strategy that causes the maximum possible FC
degradation. But in these expressions, both the optimum FC
strategy and the attacker strategy require a−priori knowledge
that cannot be obtained in practice. The performance analysis
of sub-optimum FC strategies is then characterized, and based
on the (compromised) SNs willingness to collaborate, we also
derive analytically the sub-optimum attacker strategies. Then,
considering that the FC and the attacker now act strategically,
we re-cast the problem as a minimax game between the FC and
the attacker and prove that the Nash Equilibrium (NE) exists.
Finally, we find this NE numerically in the simulation results and
this gives insight into the detection performance of the proposed
strategies.
Index Terms—Distributed detection, distributed processing,
falsified sensor nodes, wireless sensor networks (WSN).
I. INTRODUCTION
CENTRALIZED detection of a binary event is one of themost important applications of wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) [1], [2]. Multiple low-cost sensor nodes (SNs) are
often spatially deployed over a specific field to observe such
binary events. The SNs process the observed data and report
back to a fusion center (FC) that optimally combines to reach
a global decision. Being geographically dispersed to cover
large areas, the SNs are constrained in both bandwidth and
power. Moreover, SNs are usually unattended and this makes
them vulnerable to different types of attacks. The overall
detection performance strongly depends on the reliability of
these SNs in the network. While fusing the data received by
the spatially deployed SNs allows the FC to make a reliable
decision, it is possible that one or more SNs (compromised
by an attacker) deliberately falsify their local observations
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to degrade the overall FC detection performance. However,
there are a number of different approaches as to how the test
statistics received from each SN can be efficiently used in
order to achieve a reliable FC decision. Before introducing
our proposed strategies, we will first give a brief review of
related work.
The framework of distributed detection under attack−free
WSNs has been extensively studied in [3]–[13], to name but
just a few references. While [3]–[7] consider centralized detec-
tion by assuming WSNs with unlimited bandwidth/resources,
the latter assumption was relaxed in [8]–[13] by consider-
ing centralized detection over bandwidth-constrained/energy-
constrained WSNs. But these approaches are vulnerable to
some security attacks as some of the SNs reporting to the FC
may be compromised. As a result, the FC is not robust against
such attacks and its detection performance may be degraded.
However, security issues in centralized detection using
WSNs remain an open issue, see [14]–[19] and references
therein. While there are many types of security threats, in this
paper we focus on a single type of attack, which is the test
statistic falsification (TSF) attack part of the Byzantine attacks
family originally proposed by [20] and later widely used in
the context of distributed detection (e.g., [19], [21], [22]).
Reference [22] characterizes the power of the attack analyt-
ically and a closed-form expression for the worst “detection
error” is provided. Also, the minimum fraction of the compro-
mised SNs that makes the FC incapable is derived. Reference
[23] presents a technique to identify such compromised SNs
and then to exclude them from contributing to the FC fusion
process. In [24], a probabilistic TSF attack is proposed and the
theoretical performance evaluation (in terms of destructiveness
and stealthiness) is obtained. The authors of [25], in the
context of smart grids, propose heuristic centralized algorithms
to derive various strategies (attacker versus defender (i.e.,
FC) dynamics). Then, a distributed algorithm is proposed that
guarantees convergence to the centralized solution taken at the
FC.
Detection in the presence of binary falsification1 (Byzan-
tine) attacks is considered in [26]. Here, a reputation-based
scheme is proposed for identifying the compromised SNs by
accumulating the deviations between each SN and the FC
decision over a time window duration. The authors in [27]
also consider binary Byzantine attacks, in the context of target
localization, where the SNs transmit their binary decisions to
the FC. These authors also propose two techniques to mitigate
1The compromised SNs falsify their hard decisions instead of their actual
test statistics prior to transmission to the FC.
2the negative input of the compromised SNs on the FC decision.
However, identifying and then excluding the contributions of
the compromised SNs from the FC decision process may not
be the best strategy. For instance, we might end up removing
(from contributing towards the global decision) compromised
SNs that hold useful information (e.g., those SNs with high
local SNRs). Furthermore, performing detection by means of
one-bit SNs report combining at the FC is also not optimum.
Now, the publication closest to the work presented in this
paper is [19], where an under − attack WSN framework
over unlimited bandwidth is considered (i.e., infinite channel
capacity) and the detection performance is investigated. But as
the SNs are battery operated devices (i.e., limited power) and
the bandwidth is finite, the assumption of infinite capacity is
unrealistic. Furthermore, practical WSN scenarios suffer from
fading and attenuation. The authors of [19] also do not propose
any technique to mitigate the degradation caused by these
compromised SNs.
So, the work in this paper investigates the detection perfor-
mance of the under − attack energy-constrained/bandwidth-
constrained WSNs. The compromised SNs (controlled by the
attacker), are assumed to know the true hypothesis2 (e.g., [19],
[22]) and they use this a−priori knowledge to construct the
most effective strategy to make the FC’s decision unreliable.
For the FC, we assume that it is not compromised and receives
the test statistic from both types of SNs (i.e., compromised and
honest). The transmission (SNs to FC) links are modeled as
flat fading, additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels.
The assumption of flat fading is reasonable as most of the
WSNs operate at both short distances and low bit-rate due to
resource limitations.
A. Contributions & Organization
While previous publications (as outlined above) have also
examined sensor networks in the presence of falsified SNs, this
paper deals with more realistic scenarios that include limited
bandwidth fading channels, quantization of test statistics, etc.
So our main contributions are as follows:
(i) We develop an efficient FC linear weight combining
framework for an under− attack WSN that operates over
limited bandwidth fading channels. The probability of detec-
tion (Pd) and the probability of false alarm (Pfa) based on this
framework are derived in a closed-form. To maximize Pd for
a fixed Pfa and to further reduce the optimisation complexity,
we adopt the modified deflection coefficient (MDC) as an al-
ternative function to be optimized and provide an optimisation
problem to be solved from both the FC’s and the attacker’s
perspective. Based on this optimisation problem (from the
FC’s perspective), we derive analytically the optimal weight
combining, the optimal SN to FC transmit power and the
number of quantization bits for each SN. Unfortunately, these
expressions require a− priori knowledge about the attacker
parameters which cannot be attained in practice. Then (from
the attacker’s perspective), we derive analytically (for a fixed
number of compromised SNs) the optimum attacker strategy
2This leads to a conservative assessment but allows analytical tractability
of the security risk.
which also depends upon the FC weight combining and the
SNs transmit power.
(ii) So, motivated by the above, we next analyze the problem
under different attacking and defending scenarios and charac-
terize analytically the performance of sub-optimum strategies
(from both the FC’s and the attacker’s perspective) that do
not require knowledge of the FC mechanism and the attacker
parameters. Also, based on the willingness of collaboration
among the SNs (from the attacker’s perspective), we distin-
guish between two setups: a) all the SNs (compromised and
honest) share their data with their neighbors, and b) just the
compromised SNs are willing to collaborate among themselves
to improve their attack strength.
(iii) Finally, we re-cast the problem as a minimax game
between the FC and attacker and show that the NE (Nash
Equilibrium) exists. Having defined the game, we use numer-
ical simulations to find this NE point, thus identifying the
optimum behavior of both the FC and the attacker in a game-
theoretical sense.
Now, the summary of the paper is as follows. In Section II
we describe the system model and provide a data transmission
scheme. Section III describes the optimisation problem from
both the FC’s and the attacker’s perspective. In Section IV we
present our proposed attacker and FC strategies and in Section
V we re-cast the problem and analyze the equilibrium. Finally,
in Section VI we present simulation results and in Section VII
we give some conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND DATA TRANSMISSION
Consider the problem of detecting the presence of an
unknown but deterministic signal s(n) by an under− attack
WSN consisting of M geographically distributed SNs and a
FC (see Fig. 1). The honest SNs are represented with a black
color and the compromised SNs (i.e., the ones controlled by
the attacker) with a red color. The attacker’s aim is to suc-
cessfully manipulate the FC global decision making process
while the FC would like to detect reliably (i.e., with very high
probability). Each SN collects N samples of the observed
signal and performs energy estimation. Consistent with the
underlying hypotheses, the measured signal (si(n)) at the ith
SN will be further corrupted by AWGN wi(n) ∼ N (0, σi2):
H0 : xi (n) = wi (n) (1)
H1 : xi (n) = si (n) + wi (n) . (2)
The ith SN evaluates:
Ti =
N∑
n=1
(xi(n))
2
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M (3)
which for large N can be approximated by a Gaussian distri-
bution [28]. It is not difficult to derive appropriate statistics
in (4), where ξi =
N∑
n=1
s2i (n) /Nσ
2
i . While the honest SNs
transmit the actual test statistic (i.e., the true energies) to the
FC, the compromised SNs falsify them before transmitting to
the FC. Next we introduce the attacker model.
3E {Ti|H0} = Nσ2i , Var {Ti|H0} = 2Nσ4i , E {Ti|H1} = Nσ2i (1 + ξi) , Var {Ti|H1} = 2Nσ4i (1 + 2ξi) . (4)
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Fig. 1. Under attack schematic communication architecture between periph-
eral SNs and the fusion center (FC). Each SN generates a test statistic (Ti) by
observing the target and can communicate with the FC only over an energy-
constrained/bandwidth-constrained link. While the honest SNs (represented
by black color) test statistics remain unchanged, the compromised SNs
(represented by red color) falsify their test statistics to T falj with j = {3, 5}
(where j is the compromised SN index) before transmitting to the FC.
A. Compromised SNs attack
In this work, the same attack model used in [19] is consid-
ered. The attacker (which has under its control a fraction (β) of
the SNs) is assumed to know the true hypothesis2 in (5) (e.g.,
[19], [22]). The remaining SNs are honest and completely
unaware of the presence of falsified SNs. The ith compromised
SN falsifies its test statistic (Ti) before transmitting to the FC
as follows:
T fali =
{
Ti + Ci, under H0
Ti − Ci, under H1
(5)
where Ci > 0 is the parameter under the attacker’s control. As
we show later, there is an optimum Ci such that the detection
performance back at the FC will be degraded the most. So,
the test statistic (assuming compromised SNs) at the ith SN
can be represented as
Tˆi =
{
T fali , with probability β
Ti, with probability (1− β)
(6)
where β is the fraction of the compromised SNs controlled by
the attacker.
B. Data transmission
Now, because the SNs are battery operated devices (i.e.,
with limited on-board energy) then each SN i (i =
1, 2, · · · ,M ) has to quantize its test statistic (Tˆi) to Li
bits prior to transmission to the FC. We assume that the
FC is able to collect data from all the SNs via bandwidth
constrained communication channels and furthermore, it is not
itself compromised. As in [9], [13], we restrict the number of
quantization bits at the ith SN to satisfy the channel capacity
constraint:
Li ≤ 1
2
log2
(
1 +
pih
2
i
ζi
)
bits (7)
where pi denotes the transmit power of sensor i, hi is the
flat fading coefficient between SN i and the FC, and ζi is the
variance of the AWGN at the FC. The quantized test statistic
(T qi ) at the i
th SN can be modeled (with Li bits ) as
T qi = Tˆi + vi (8)
where vi is quantization noise independent of wi (n) in (1)
and (2). Assuming Ti ∈ [0, 2U ], then

Tˆi ∈ [Ci, 2U + Ci], under H0 with probability β
Tˆi ∈ [−Ci, 2U − Ci], under H1 with probability β
Tˆi ∈ [0, 2U ], under {Hp}p={0,1} with probability 1− β.
(9)
Now, assuming a uniform quantizer with Li bits (i.e., with
a total of 2Li quantization levels), the quantizer step-size is
always  = 2U
2Li
and now vi (see (8)) can be modeled as a
r.v. uniformly distributed3 with vi ∈ [− 2 , 2 ], where it is well-
known that
σ2vi =
U2
3× 22Li . (10)
Note that the above analysis shows that the attacker (i.e.,
through the compromised SNs), does not introduce a larger
quantization error noise (i.e., σ2vi in (10) remains the same as
in the case of attack−free [9]). Now, linearly combining{
T qi
}M
i=1
at the FC gives
Tf =
M∑
i=1
αiT
q
i (11)
where the weights
{
αi
}M
i=1
will be optimized in Section
III-A. For large M , the probability of detection (Pd) and
the probability of false alarm (Pfa) can be approximated and
3This model that leads to (10) is only accurate for a relatively high number
of bits (e.g., Li ≥ 3 in practice). For a smaller number of bits, the expression
in (10) may not be very accurate but it is the only statistical measure available
for such errors.
4E
{
T fali |H0
}
= Nσ2i +Ci,Var
{
T fali |H0
}
= 2Nσ4i ,E
{
T fali |H1
}
=Nσ2i (1 + ξi)−Ci,Var
{
T fali |H1
}
=2Nσ4i (1+2ξi) . (13)
shown to be respectively [19]:
Pd = Pr (Tf ≥ Λf |H1)
= 1T
(
DQ
 Λf − µ¯|H1√ M∑
i=1
α2i
(
Var {Ti|H1}+ σ2vi
)

)
Pfa = Pr (Tf ≥ Λf |H0)
= 1T
(
DQ
 Λf − µ¯|H0√ M∑
i=1
α2i
(
Var {Ti|H0}+ σ2vi
)

)
(12)
with Λf = Λf [1, 1, · · · , 12M ]T (Λf is the FC detection
threshold); 12M is a column vector of all ones;
D = diag ([b1
⊙
b2
⊙ · · ·⊙bM ]) (bi is the ith column
vector of B (where B =
(
1 − β)P + βPc) and ⊙
represents element-wise multiplication); the matrix P is
a binary matrix holding the 2M possible combinations
of M (compromised and honest) SNs on its rows with
(P)ij = {0, 1} representing the compromised and
honest SNs respectively (note that (P)ij represents the
(i, j) element of P); and Pc is the element-wise (i.e.,
bitwise) logical complement of P. Now, {µ¯|Hp}p={0,1} =
P {µ|Hp}p={0,1} + Pc
{
µfal|Hp
}
p={0,1} with {µ|Hp} =
[α1E {T1|Hp} , · · · , αME {TM |Hp}]T and
{
µfal|Hp
}
=
[α1E
{
T fal1 |Hp
}
, α2E
{
T fal2 |Hp
}
, · · · , αME
{
T falM |Hp
}
]T
where E {Ti|Hp} and E
{
T fali |Hp
}
are given in (4) and (13)
respectively.
Finally, Q(.) represents the element-wise Q function op-
eration. Next, we describe the optimisation problem under a
power-constrained WSN.
III. FC AND ATTACKER PERFORMANCE OPTIMISATION
UNDER A POWER-CONSTRAINED WSN
Now, if the attacker (which has under its control a fraction
(β) of the M SNs) can successfully manipulate the FC
global decision making process, the detection rate will be
significantly low, the error rate in decision making will be
high and the FC performance will be degraded. From the
attacker’s point of view, the more error it causes in the FC
decision making, the more successful it is. The attacker has
two available strategies: a) direct the compromised SNs to
actually report their observation to the FC truthfully or b)
direct the compromised SNs to falsify their observations prior
to transmission to the FC. In the cases where the attacker
decides to direct the compromised SNs to falsify their test
statistics, what should be their optimum attacking parameter
(Ci)? We will answer this question in Section III-B.
From the FC’s point of view, its data fusion mechanism
should be robust and capable of defending against any attack-
ing strategy adopted by any compromised SNs and directed by
the attacker. The FC is aware that the attacker has an objective
in conflict with its own (i.e., the FC tries to maximize the
detection probability while the attacker tries to minimize it).
However, the FC does not have any exact information about
the attacking strategies. The only information available to the
FC is: a) the quantized test statistics
{
T qi
}M
i=1
reported by M
spatially distributed SNs, and b) the fraction4 (β) of these test
statistics that are falsified. But it cannot recognize where these
SNs are and estimate their “falsification parameter”, Ci. So,
the fusion data mechanism (based on this limited a − priori
information) should be able to neutralize (or at least reduce)
the impact of these compromised SNs.
So, in this Section, we would like to analyze the perfor-
mance optimisation from the perspective of the FC and the
attacker under a constraint of a maximum transmit power
budget (Pt). Since the FC has under its control only the weight
combiners (αi,∀i) in (11) and the SN to FC transmit power
(pi,∀i) in (7), its strategy is to maximize Pd with respect to
the respective vectors containing these parameters (i.e., α and
p). However, this is difficult and no closed-form solution can
be obtained. Here, we introduce the MDC (which we will use
later as an alternative function to be optimized). The MDC
provides a good measure of the detection performance since
it characterizes the variance-normalized distance between the
centers of two conditional PDFs. This is given as:
d˜2 (α,p)=
(
E {Tf |H1}−E {Tf |H0}√
Var {Tf |H1}
)2
=
(
bTα
)2
αTRα
(14)
with the appropriate quantities given in (15) and (16) and
where
b = [Nσ21ξ1 − 2βC1, . . . , Nσ2MξM − 2βCM ]T
α = [α1, α2, . . . , αM ]
T ,p = [p1, p2, . . . , pM ]
T
R = diag

2Nσ41(1 + 2ξ1) + β(1− β)C21 + σ2v1
2Nσ42(1 + 2ξ2) + β(1− β)C22 + σ2v2
...
2Nσ4M (1 + 2ξM ) + β(1− β)C2M + σ2vM
 .
(17)
A. FC performance optimisation
Now, the FC task (which knows that the WSN is under−
attack) is to maximize the Pd (i.e., to detect with very high
probability). We would like to make it clear that the FC knows4
β (i.e., knows the average percentage of compromised SNs
4In practice, the fraction representing the (on average) compromised SNs
can be learned by observing the data sent by the SNs to the FC over a time
window. But such an approach is beyond the scope of this work.
5E {Tf |H0} =
M∑
i=1
αi
(
Nσ2i
)
+
M∑
i=1
αi (βCi) , E {Tf |H1} =
M∑
i=1
αi
(
Nσ2i (1 + ξi)
)− M∑
i=1
αi (βCi) . (15)
Var {Tf |H0} =
M∑
i=1
α2i
(
2Nσ4i + β(1− β)C2i + σ2vi
)
,Var {Tf |H1} =
M∑
i=1
α2i
(
2Nσ4i (1 + 2ξi) + β(1− β)C2i + σ2vi
)
. (16)
(e.g., [19], [22])) but it cannot identify exactly who they are.
Given the data fusion (11), the FC performs the following test:
if Tf < Λf , decide H0
if Tf ≥ Λf , decide H1
}
(18)
where Λf is the FC detection threshold. As we said earlier,
the optimum weighting vector (αo) and the optimum power
allocation vector (po) that maximize Pd under the constraint
of a maximum transmit power budget (Pt) are desired. More
specifically (adopting the MDC), we require:
(αo,po) = arg max
α,p
(
d˜2 (α,p)
)
subject to
M∑
i=1
pi ≤ Pt, pi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M.
(19)
It is easily shown [9] that αo = R−1b with
αoi =
(σ2i ξi − 2βCiN )
2σ4i (1 + 2ξi) +
β(1−β)C2i
N +
σ2vi
N
,∀i = 1, 2, · · · ,M.
(20)
Note that the optimum weights
{
αoi
}M
i=1
are a function of the
SN transmit power (pi) through the σ2vi terms (see (7) and
(10)) and pi is still to be optimized. We now substitute αo
back into (14) and solve the following optimisation problem
po = arg max
p
(
d˜2 (αo,p)
)
subject to
M∑
i=1
pi ≤ Pt for pi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M.
It can also be shown [9], that the above optimisation problem
can be solved analytically by using the Lagrangian function
and solving the appropriate K.K.T. conditions. The optimum
SN to FC transmit power in this case (i.e., where the WSN is
under−attack) can be shown to be
poi =
[
U√
λ0
√
ζi
12h2i
(
σ2i ξi − 2βCiN
σ4i (1 + 2ξi) + β(1− β)C
2
i
2N )
)
−
U2ζi
h2i
6Nσ4i (1 + 2ξi) + 3β(1− β)C2i
− ζi
h2i
]+
(21)
where [y]+ equals 0 if y < 0, otherwise it equals y, and
λ0 is the Lagrangian multiplier that can be evaluated in a
similar way as in [9] by imposing the equality constraint
(i.e.,
M∑
i=1
pi = Pt) in (19). Now, (21) assumes that the FC
knows the channel coefficients (hi) for all SNs (honest and
compromised). While the FC can obtain this information via
a feedback from the honest SNs, the compromised SNs may
transmit to the FC wrong information regarding the channel.
Nevertheless, here we assume that the compromised SNs only
falsify their test statistics as in (5) and report true channel5
information to the FC. However, the channel information, for
the compromised SNs, could be obtained by blind channel
estimation techniques, etc., [29], [30]. Next, we analyze the
performance optimisation from the attacker perspective.
B. Attacker performance optimisation
Now, the attacker would like to degrade as much as possible
the FC detection performance. For a constant β (i.e., fraction
of compromised SNs) the attacker plans the optimum Ci
in (5) such that the FC becomes inefficient (i.e., useless).
Adopting again the MDC (14), the optimisation problem can
be expressed as:
Coi = arg min
Ci
(
d˜2 (αi, pi, Ci)
)
. (22)
Note that (14) reaches its minimum value (i.e., zero) when
bTα =
M∑
i=1
αi
(
Nσ2i ξi − 2βCi
)
= 0. Assuming that Ci =
C, ∀i (i.e., the same attack strength for all the compromised
SNs) for simplicity, clearly the minimum of (14) can be
achieved with
Co =
M∑
i=1
αiNσ
2
i ξi
2β
M∑
i=1
αi
. (23)
Now, this yields the maximum possible degradation that the
attacker can cause to the FC. As can be seen, the optimum
attacker strategy (Co) is a function of the FC strategy (i.e., αi
in (11) which itself is a function of pi through the σ2vi quantity
(see (7), (10) and (20)). So, in order to adopt this strategy,
the attacker needs to know αi and pi, ∀i. Since the FC is
not compromised (i.e., still acts accordingly), these quantities
cannot normally be obtained by the attacker.
As can be seen from the optimum FC weight protection
strategy (20) and the attacker optimum strategy (23), there
does not exist a dominant6 approach. Clearly the FC weights
(αi in (11)) depend on the attacker parameter Ci and vice
versa. Next, we discuss in more detail the attacker versus the
FC strategies and provide performance analysis in cases where
limited a− priori knowledge about the attacker is available
(i.e., without the need of exact knowledge of Ci).
5The channel estimation error (for both the honest and compromised SNs)
can be modeled as a Gaussian random variable (i.e., hˆij = hij + eh) where
eh ∼ N (0, σ2eh ) and hˆij is the estimated flat fading channel coefficient.
6A dominant FC (attacker) strategy is said to be strictly dominant if it is the
best strategy for the FC (attacker), no matter how the attacker (FC) decides
to act.
6IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this Section, starting with the optimum attacker strategy
(23) and depending on the collaboration willingness among
SNs and the available a−priori information that the attacker
has about the FC combining strategy, we distinguish between
two simulation setups in Section IV-A. Next, in Section IV-B
we distinguish again between two different simulation setups
but now from the perspective of the FC mechanisms.
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Fig. 2. Under attack schematic communication architecture among peripheral
SNs and the FC. Similarly to Fig. 1, each SN generates a test statistic (Ti)
by observing the target (not shown here for clearance purposes)). While the
honest SNs (black color) keep their test statistics unchanged, the compromised
SNs (red color) directed by the attacker, will falsify their test statistics to T falj
with j = {3, 4, 5} (where j is the compromised SN index). The SNs have
partial connectivity among themselves (i.e., not a complete graph) (thin lines)
and can communicate with the FC (thick lines) but only over an energy-
constrained/bandwidth-constrained links.
A. Sub-optimum attacker’s strategies
Here, we assume that the attacker knows that the FC uses a
linear combining strategy but it is not aware of the combining
weights used in (11). We also assume that the FC does not
act strategically and uses weight combining, without trying to
optimize against the behavior of compromised SNs. We now
distinguish between the two following setups A-1 and A-2.
1) Honest and compromised SNs collaborate (HCSC):
Now, the optimum strategy (23) to be adopted by each
compromised SN requires knowledge that cannot be obtained
in practice as previously discussed. As a result, the attacker
(not aware of αi and pi, ∀i) reasonably assumes equal
combining at the FC (i.e., αi = 1M ,∀i) and directs the
compromised SNs to attack with
CHCSC =
N
M
M∑
i=1
σ2i ξi
2β
(24)
where the superscript “HCSC” refers to “Honest and
Compromised SNs Collaborate”. However, the compro-
mised SNs still require knowledge of σ2i and ξi,∀i (to evaluate
M∑
i=1
σ2i ξi) in order to implement the attacking strategy (24).
When all the M SNs (honest and compromised) form a
connected network7 and are willing to collaborate with each
other (see Fig. 2), the quantity
M∑
i=1
σ2i ξi in (24) can be
7A connected network is any network where there is a path (i.e., over one
or more links) between every pair of SNs in the network.
estimated using the average consensus algorithm [31]. Because
of the communication topology for the M SNs (i.e., not
fully connected), the average consensus algorithm ensures the
availability of this term at each SN. The compromised SNs
will still be camouflaged (i.e., unidentified) as they share with
their neighbors just the true quantity σ2i ξi and the SNs cannot
identify if their neighbors are honest or compromised.
2) Compromised SNs (only) collaborate (CSC): Now,
in the cases where not all of the M SNs (compromised and
honest) are willing to collaborate with each other, the quantity
M∑
i=1
σ2i ξi in (23) cannot be obtained in practice. Note that the
attacker has under its control just a fraction (β) (β = FM ≤ 1,
where F is the number of falsified SNs) of M SNs (see Fig.
2) and the other remaining honest SNs (M −F ) do not share
their observations with their neighbors. In this situation, the
F compromised SNs collaborate with each other in order to
estimate in a distributed fashion the
∑
i∈J
σ2i ξi quantity, where
J represents the compromised SNs set with cardinality F .
Assuming that the F falsified SNs form a connected7 network,
the average consensus algorithm [31] (like before) ensures the
availability of this term at each falsified SN. After this stage,
the compromised SNs attack (i.e., falsify their test statistics
(3) as in (5)) with Ci = CCSC ,∀i with
CCSC =
N(M − F )
M
∑
i∈J
σ2i ξi
2β
(25)
where the superscript “CSC” refers to “Compromised
SNs (only) Collaborate”.
B. Sub-optimum FC’s strategies
Now, the optimum weights (αoi ,∀i) in (20) are a function
of the attacker parameter Ci which is difficult in practice
(if not impossible) to obtain by the FC. In such a case, the
FC adopts a sub-optimum but simple solution to minimize
the degradation caused by the attacker. Assuming that the
attacker does not act strategically (i.e., does not try to optimize
against the FC approach) we now distinguish between the two
following simulation setups B-1 and B-2.
1) Weak attack FC based belief (WAFBB): Now,
when the number of observed samples (N ) is large and the FC
believes that the attacker is directing the ith compromised SN
to attack with relatively small Ci, the FC weight combining
can be approximated with
αWAFBBi =
σ2i ξi
2σ4i (1 + 2ξi) +
σ2vi
N
,∀i = 1, 2, · · · ,M (26)
where the superscript “WAFBB” refers to “Weak
Attack FC Based Belief” and the optimum SN to FC
transmit power can be also approximated with
pWAFBBi
=
[
U√
λ0
√
ζi
12h2i
(
σ2i ξi
σ4i (1 + 2ξi)
)
−
U2ζi
h2i
6Nσ4i (1 + 2ξi)
− ζi
h2i
]+
.
(27)
7Now, (26) and (27) coincide with the optimum weights and
with the optimal SN transmit power allocation scheme respec-
tively derived for the case of attack−free WSN in [9].
2) Optimum attack FC based belief (OAFBB): Here,
we consider the case when the FC believes that the attacker,
with a fraction (β) of SNs under its control, attacks with the
optimum parameter Co (see (23)) (i.e., with Ci = Co in (5)
but with αi = 1M ,∀i).
First of all, note that the FC knows that the compromised
SNs (i.e., the attacker) have an alternative objective (i.e., the
attacker would like to minimize, while the FC would like
to maximize, the MDC in (14)) (i.e., the FC can work out
the optimisation problem from the attacker perspective and
evaluate (23)). Secondly, the FC concludes that the attacker
cannot adopt this strategy in practice (since this optimum
strategy requires αi,∀i and this parameter is controlled by
the FC itself). In such a situation, it is reasonable that the
FC believes that the attacker guides the compromised SNs to
attack with Co (see (23) but with αi = 1M ,∀i). Now, the
FC protection weights (αOAFBBi ) can be shown to be (by
substituting Ci = N2βM
M∑
i=1
σ2i ξi in (20) and rearranging the
terms):
αOAFBBi =
σ2i ξi − 1M
M∑
i=1
σ2i ξi
2σ4i (1 + 2ξi) +N(1− β)
(
1
2
√
βM
M∑
i=1
σ2i ξi
)2
+
σ2vi
N
.
(28)
The SN to FC transmit power (pOAFBBi ) can be obtained
in a similar way (by substituting Ci = N2βM
M∑
i=1
σ2i ξi
into (21)). Lastly, the superscript “OAFBB” refers to
“Optimum Attack FC Based Belief”.
V. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section, we consider the case where both the attacker
and the FC act strategically and formulate the problem as a
minimax game between two players, i.e., the attacker and the
FC. The attacker has under its control one parameter (i.e.,
Ci ∀i ∈ J , with J defined in Section IV-A2) while the
FC has control of the weight combining vector (i.e., α). As
before, assuming C = Ci (i.e., the same attack strength for
each compromised SN) for simplicity, we first of all prove
the existence of the Nash Equilibrium (NE)8 by showing
that there exists a unique saddle-point in the minimax game
between the attacker and the FC. Then, we find the optimum
solution numerically by maximizing the deflection coefficient
with respect to the FC weight combining parameter and then
by minimizing it with respect to the attacker parameter (i.e.,
w.r.t. C). Next, we present a theorem, by help of which in
Section V-A and Section V-B we prove the existence of NE.
Theorem 1 (Nikaido, [34]). Let K(x, y) be a pay-off func-
tion defined on the product space of X by Y , where X and Y
are convex compact sets and continuous in each variable for
8A Nash equilibrium, is a set of strategies, one for each player, such that
no player has the incentive to unilaterally change its action. Players are in
equilibrium if a change in strategies by any one of them would lead that
player to earn less than if it remained with its current strategy.
any fixed value of the other. If K(x, y) is quasi-concave in x
and quasi-convex in y, then:
max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
K(x, y) = min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
K(x, y). (29)
Next, we present the behavior of the MDC w.r.t. attacker
strength C.
A. Modified deflection coefficient behavior with respect to C
In the next Lemma we prove the quasi-convexity behavior
of the MDC w.r.t. C.
Lemma 1 : For a given α and p, d˜2 in (14) is a quasi-convex
function of C.
Proof : The MDC can be written as:
d˜2 =
(x− 2βCb)2
y + dC2
(30)
where x =
M∑
i=1
αi
(
Nσ2i ξi
)
, b =
M∑
i=1
αi, d =
M∑
i=1
α2i
(
β(1−β)
)
,
y =
M∑
i=1
α2i
(
2Nσ4i (1 + 2ξi) + σ
2
vi
)
.
Now considering α as a constant, differentiate d˜2 w.r.t. C and
by further simplification, we obtain:
∂d˜2
∂C
=
(
2βbC − x
)(
4βby + 2xdC
)
(
y + dC2
)2 = 0. (31)
So solving the above yields two critical points:
C∗1 =
x
2βb
, C∗2 = −
2βby
xd
. (32)
Now, for a feasible attacker strength (i.e., for C > 0), the
critical point C∗1 is feasible if x, b > 0 or x, b < 0. So, we
have the following:
if x, b > 0 and for C > C∗1 , f
′(C) > 0
if x, b < 0 and for C > C∗1 , f
′(C) > 0
if x, b > 0 and for C < C∗1 , f
′(C) < 0
if x, b < 0 and for C < C∗1 , f
′(C) < 0
 =⇒
C∗1 is a global minimum. (33)
We also conclude that the other critical point C∗2 is not even
a feasible point (i.e., C∗2 < 0) for x, b > 0 and x, b < 0.
Hence, there is only one value of C = C∗1 at which d˜2 = 0.
As a result, C∗1 being the unique global minimum =⇒ d˜2 is
a quasi-convex function of C.
B. Modified deflection coefficient behavior with respect to α
and p
Now, in Lemma 2, we show the behavior of d˜2 in (14) from
the perspective of the FC.
Lemma 2 : For a given C and p, d˜2 is a concave function
of α.
8Proof : Consider (14), then the Hessian of d˜2 w.r.t. α (i.e.,
Hd˜2 ) can easily shown to be:
Hd˜2 = 2
bbT
αRα
− 4 b
Tα(
αRα
)2(bαTR + RαbT)
+ 8
(
αT b
)2(
αRα
)3(RααTR)− 2
(
αT b
)2(
αRα
)2(R). (34)
Now, to prove that d˜2 is a concave function of α, we need to
show [33]: αTHd˜2α ≤ 0,∀α. This is given in Section VIII.
From (36), αTHd˜2α = 0,∀α =⇒ d˜2 is a concave function
of α where the αoi ,∀i in (20) is the optimum solution. This
concludes the proof.
Similarly, treating C (i.e., the attacker strength) fixed and
for a given α (i.e., the weight combiner vector) it can be easily
shown that d˜2 is also a concave function of p and poi in (21)
is the optimum solution. The proof is straightforward and we
omit it here due to lack of space.
Now, since any concave function is quasi-concave, then by
Theorem 1, a unique saddle-point exists in the minimax game
which is the NE. We numerically evaluate this NE in the
simulation results section.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this Section, the performances of the proposed strategies
are evaluated numerically and compared to the attack−free
scheme [9]. A WSN with a total of M = 12 SNs is
considered (where a fraction of these SNs are compro-
mised by the attacker with the same attacking strength (i.e.,
Ci = C, ∀i) for simplicity). We let σ2i = 0.1, such that
ξa = 10 log10
(
1
M
M∑
i=1
ξi
)
=−10.5 dB with arbitrarily chosen
s(n) = [s1(n), s2(n), · · · , sM (n)] = [0.022, 0.0011, 0.18,
0.02, 0.0143, 0.0011, 0.0024, 0.2, 0.06, 0.09, 0.0143, 0.15]
unless otherwise stated. The corresponding SN to FC channel
gains are assumed to be ideally estimated (i.e., σ2eh = 0) for
simplicity and are shown in Fig. 3. In addition we let ζi = 0.1,
∀i. Finally, we choose Li with equality in (7).
A. SN to FC optimal transmit power allocation and FC weight
combining strategy
Now, we investigate the SN to FC transmit power for
the optimum allocation scheme9 and the FC optimal weight
combining strategy derived in Section III-A.
Fig. 3 (the middle plot) shows the optimal SN transmit
power poi for the i
th SN to the FC channel versus the attacker
strength C and the lower plot shows the corresponding quanti-
zation bits. The actual channel coefficients (randomly chosen)
are in the upper plot. Clearly, for the case of C = 0 (i.e., the
attack− free scheme in [9]), more power is allocated to the
SNs (i.e., SN3, SN8, SN9, SN10, and SN12) having both the
9The optimum SN power allocation scheme requires knowledge of the
attacker strength Ci (see (21)). This is a strong assumption in practice and
the exact knowledge of Ci cannot be attained in general. Nevertheless, here
we consider this situation for performance comparison purposes and to create
an idea about how the SN to FC transmit power allocation is affected.
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Fig. 3. SN optimal transmit power (poi ) and channel bit allocation (Li) with
Pt = 60, U = 3, ξa = −10.5 dB, N = 20, β = 0.1 and σ2eh = 0.
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Fig. 4. FC optimal weights (αoi ) versus the attacker strength (C) with U = 3,
ξa = −10.5 dB, Pt = 60, M = 12, N = 20, β = 0.1 and σ2eh = 0.
best channels and high enough SNRs (ξi). Interestingly, those
remaining SNs having very low SNRs (i.e., having useless
local information) but having good (or bad) corresponding
channels, are censored (i.e., do not transmit even a single bit).
In this way, the SNs that have very bad channels (i.e., SNs
that require very high power to transmit) or the SNs that have
low SNRs (i.e., SNs that do not contain useful information)
will be censored (i.e., will not transmit even one bit). This is
not the case when C = 0.5 or C = 5 (we give an explanation
later).
In Fig. 4 we investigate the FC combining response (with
weight in (20)) versus attacker strength C. Clearly, when C =
0, the weights for the SNs permitted to transmit to the FC
(i.e., SN3, SN8, SN9, SN10, and SN12) are greater than 0. As
expected, the weights for the other remaining SNs are set to 0
(as these SNs are censored). Now, when C starts to increase,
the FC response is decreasing the weights for all the SNs up to
around C = 5 and allowing all the SNs to transmit to the FC
(see Fig. 3 (middle plot)). However, for around C > 5, the FC
response is by first increasing the weights for the SNs having
low SNRs and as C gets larger, the FC combining strategy
tends towards equal combining.
90 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
F
C
op
ti
m
al
w
ei
gh
ts
,,
o i
Fraction of compromised SNs, -
SN1
SN2
SN3
SN4
SN5
SN6
SN7
SN8
SN9
SN10
SN11
SN12
0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
-0.018
-0.016
-0.014
-0.012
-0.01
-0.008SN8
SN10
SN9
SN1, SN2, SN4, SN5, SN6, SN7, SN11
SN3
SN12
Fig. 5. FC optimal weights (αoi ) versus fraction of the compromised SNs (β)
with U = 3, Pt = 60, N = 20, Ci = 0.1, ∀i and σ2eh = 0.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
F
C
op
ti
m
al
w
ei
gh
ts
,,
o i
Fraction of compromised SNs, -
SN1
SN2
SN3
SN4
SN5
SN6
SN7
SN8
SN9
SN10
SN11
SN12
0.26 0.28 0.3 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.4 0.42 0.44
-0.09
-0.085
-0.08
-0.075
-0.07
-0.065
-0.06
-0.055
SN8
SN9
SN12
SN10
SN3
SN1, SN2, SN4, SN5,
SN6, SN7, SN11
Fig. 6. FC optimal weights (αoi ) versus fraction of the compromised SNs (β)
with U = 3, Pt = 60, N = 20, Ci = 0.6, ∀i and σ2eh = 0.
Similar to Fig. 4, in Fig. 5 (for C = 0.1) and in Fig.
6 (for C = 0.6) we plot the FC combining response (with
weights in (20)) but now versus the fraction of compromised
SNs (β). Interestingly, the optimal FC weight response for the
less informative SNs (i.e., SN1, SN2, SN4, SN5, SN6, SN7,
and SN11 classified by the power allocation scheme in the
case of attack − free (i.e., C = 0)) remains almost constant
with respect to β both in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. However, that
is not the case for the more informative SNs (i.e., SN3,
SN8, SN9, SN10, and SN12). In Fig. 5, we observe that
for the SNs 3, 8, and 12 (corresponding to the best SNRs)
this relationship is convex while for the SNs 9 and 10 it is
monotonically decreasing. Interestingly, in Fig. 6 (for a larger
C) this relationship becomes monotonically decreasing for all
the more informative SNs mentioned above.
The results provided in this Section cannot be attained in
practice as the exact knowledge of C is required. However,
they provide an insight as to how the FC power allocation
and the weight combining strategy is influenced by both the
attacker strength (C) and the compromised SNs fraction (β).
B. Detection performance for the proposed strategies
1) Detection performance for fixed β: Now, we in-
vestigate the detection performance of the proposed strategies
described in Section IV-B for a fixed β.
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In Fig. 7, we show the receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) parametrized on the attacker strength (C) for the
proposed WAFBB and OAFBB strategies compared to the
attack free (AF ) case [9] (i.e., when there is no attack). We
can observe that for C = 0.3 (as expected), the WAFBB
strategy performs similar to the optimum strategy in (20) and
better than OAFBB (up to C = 0.6) whereas after that, the
OAFBB strategy dramatically outperforms the latter. We also
note that for relatively very large C, it is possible to totally
blind the FC when the WAFBB is used (i.e., to make it
incapable of detecting) but only when the WSN operates at
low probability of false alarm (Pfa).
Now, we would like to emphasize that the WAFBB
strategy has particular importance when the FC does not have
any a−priori knowledge about the β and C parameters. But
the OAFBB strategy requires just knowledge of the compro-
mised SNs fraction4 (β) which is possible to be obtained by
the FC in practice.
2) Detection performance for fixed C: Now, we in-
vestigate the detection performance of the proposed strategies
described in Section IV-B for a fixed C.
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In Fig. 8, we show the ROC performance for the two
different proposed strategies (parametrized on β) compared to
the optimum strategy in (20) and AF in [9]. We can observe
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Fig. 9. Probability of detection (Pd) versus probability of false alarm (Pfa)
with U = 3, Pt = 60, M = 12, N = 20 and Ci = 0.6, ∀i, and σ2eh = 0.
that for small β (more specifically β = 0.1), both the optimum
and OAFBB strategies outperform the WAFBB strategy
and their performances are worst than the AF performance.
Interesting, when β increases (more specifically, β = 0.5 and
β = 1), both the optimum and OAFBB strategies outperform
the AF detection performance for all the values of Pfa and
their detection performances improve proportionally with β.
This is as expected, since from the attacker’s perspective
there does exists an optimum β that most degrades the FC’s
detection capability (Fig. 10 later on captures and demonstrates
this behavior better) (see also (23)). We would also like to
make it clear that the FC’s ROC performance behavior depends
not only on the compromised SNs fraction (β) but also on
the attacker strength (Ci). Furthermore, the optimum β that
causes the maximum FC’s detection degradation depends itself
in Ci (see (23)). Deviating from this optimum strategy (i.e.,
(β, Ci)), the attacker might help the FC to further utilize its
detection performance rather than causing degradation. While
from β = 0.5 to β = 1 the performance of the optimum
strategy in (20) and the OAFBB strategy improves, that is not
the case when WAFBB is used (its performance degrades)
and when β = 1 it is sufficient to blind the FC even when the
WSN operates at a relatively high Pfa. Now, this is as expected
because the WAFBB requires no a − priori knowledge
regarding the attacker’s parameters.
In Fig. 9, we investigate the same situation as for Fig. 8 but
now for C = 0.6. In this case (when β = 0.1), the optimum
strategy slightly outperforms the OAFBB and WAFBB
strategies. However, similar to Fig. 8, when more than 50%
of SNs are compromised, the OAFBB strategy significantly
outperforms the WAFBB strategy. Furthermore, its detection
performance improves (for β ≥ 0.5) proportionally as β
increases.
In Fig. 10, we again show the ROC as a function of β
but now for a lower C (more specifically for C = 0.2).
As expected, the WAFBB performs similar to the optimum
strategy and outperforms the OAFBB at low β and C, as
the WAFBB is derived under these assumptions. Also, we
can observe that the ROC performance of the optimum and
OAFBB strategies (when β = 0.1 is used) outperforms those
when β = 0.5. This is an intuitive result as the smaller the
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Fig. 10. Probability of detection (Pd) versus probability of false alarm (Pfa)
with U = 3, Pt = 60, M = 12, N = 20, Ci = 0.2, ∀i and σ2eh = 0.
fraction of compromised SNs participating in the network,
the better is the FC’s detection performance. However, for
β ≥ 0.5, the detection performance is shown to be improving
with β whereas for the WAFBB strategy its performance
degrades as β increases. Interestingly, when 50% of the SNs
are compromised, both the optimum and OAFBB strategies
perform in a similar manner.
It is now clear that (from the attacker perspective) there is an
optimum number of compromised SNs (fraction β) that causes
the maximum FC’s detection performance degradation when
using the OAFBB and the optimum FC strategy in (20). On
the contrary, when the WAFBB strategy is considered, we
conclude that the FC’s detection performance degrades as β
increases. However, it has particular importance in practice as
no a−priori knowledge for the attacker parameters is required.
C. Equilibrium analysis of minimax game
In this section we analyze the equilibrium point of the
minimax game and find the Nash Equilibrium (NE). The NE
is the maximum probability of detection considering the FC’s
best linear weight combining strategy (joint optimization of
α,p) against attacker’s strategy (i.e., C for a given fraction
of compromised SNs β).
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In Fig. 11 the ROC behavior against the attacker’s strength
and the FC’s combining weights is shown. As expected (see
Section V on equilibrium analysis) there does exist a NE and
it is shown to occur for the pair C = 0.4 and αo (with αoi
in (20)). Clearly, from the attacker’s perspective, this strategy
causes the maximum detection performance degradation ∀Pfa
and deviating from this strategy will not benefit the attacker.
Now, in Fig. 12, the modified deflection coefficient (MDC)
against the attacker strength (C) is shown for two examples
(i.e., with the optimum FC weights combining in (20) and
the non-optimum weight combining drawn from the uniform
distribution (i.e., αi ∼ U(0, 1) in (11)). We can observe that
the NE is shown to occur at C = 1 and deviating from this
point (i.e., this strategy) the attacker will not benefit (i.e., it will
not gain in terms of the FC’s performance degradation). It is
also clear that if the FC deviates from the optimum combining
strategy (i.e., from the weights αoi in (20)), its detection
performance will be worst or at least will not improve ∀C.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have addressed the problem of distributed
detection by an under − attack WSN that operates over
limited bandwidth communication fading channels. Based on
a simple linear weight combining rule at the FC and adopting
the modified deflection coefficient (as an alternative function
to be optimized), we give closed-form expressions for the
optimal FC combining weights, the SN to FC transmit power
allocation, and the test statistics quantization bits. The attacker
optimal strategy is also derived and shown to be dependent
on the FC combining weights. Furthermore, sub-optimum FC
strategies (based on weight combining and the SN transmit
power) that do not require the exact knowledge of the attacker
strength C are also derived and analyzed.
We have also analyzed the equilibrium to the minimax
problem and have proved that the Nash Equilibrium (NE)
exists and found this optimal solution numerically in the
simulation results. We compare our proposed FC strategies
with the one derived under an attack − free scenario and
show significant detection performance improvement.
Future work will consider a general (non-linear) optimal
combining strategy at the FC and study attackers that (unlike
in this paper) do not know the true state of the target (i.e.,
they are less dangerous attackers).
VIII. PROOF OF αTHd˜2α ≤ 0,∀α IN (34)
Consider the Hd˜2 in (34), and show that α
THd˜2α = 0,∀α.
Proof : Multiplying (34) from the left by αT and from the
right by α, we get:
αTHd˜2α = 2
αT bbTα
αTRα
−4 α
T bTα(
αTRα
)2(bαTR+RαbT)α
+ 8
αT
(
αT b
)2(
αTRα
)3 (RααTR)α− 2
(
αTαT b
)2(
αTRα
)2 (R)α. (35)
Rearranging the terms and by further simplification, we obtain:
αTHd˜2α = 2
αT bbTα
αTRα
− 8b
TααT b
αTRα
+ 8
bTααT b
αTRα
− 2α
T bbTα
αTRα
= 0. (36)
This concludes the proof.
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